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Vossen: Disraeli, Gladstone, and The Reform Act of 1867

DISRAELI, GLADSTONE, AND THE REFORM ACT OF 1867
JustinVossen (History)
Larry Witherell, Faculty Mentor (History)
This research project investigated the rivalry between William Gladstone and
Benjamin Disraeli, and how that rivalry resulted in the Reform Act of 1867. The
competition between these two over expansion of the franchise led to a more radical
reform than expected. Gladstone, a converted Liberal, encouraged moderate changes like
a reduction in the householder qualification from ₤ten to ₤seven. Disraeli, a moderate
Conservative, embraced more expansive reform for political advancement rather than as
an extension of the suffrage. It was Disraeli’s hope that an enlarged electorate would vote
Conservative as a reward for their new privilege. Although many historians give Disraeli
credit for the second Reform bill, most fail to connect Gladstone’s initial attempts at
reform with the bill’s final shape. True credit for the passage of the Reform Act of 1867
lies with Disraeli and Gladstone. The Reform bill was created out of political infighting
as opposed to popular opinion. An examination of the rivalry between Gladstone and
Disraeli raises the question of what the bill would have looked like without these two
politicians. This project used primary materials such as the parliamentary debates, the
London Times newspaper, memoirs, and letters of public figures as well as secondary
materials such as books, journals, and dissertations.
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I. Introduction
Although the means to the end were unknown to most members of Parliament at
the time, the Reform Act of 1867, unlike its predecessor the Reform Act of 1832,
achieved the goal of opening the franchise to the British working class. The 1867 Reform
Act was the culmination of two determined leaders of diametrically opposed parties, both
of whom understood the importance of party unity in accomplishing reform. William
Gladstone, leader of the Liberal party, had to contend with a loose coalition with Whigs
of the old guard, represented by Robert Lowe on the right wing and Radicals, represented
by John Bright on the left. Historian F.B. Smith wrote, “party organization was weak and
the whips had no means of effectively disciplining members: men chose to follow a
leader by their own volition”1
Benjamin Disraeli led a Conservative party that was much more cohesive, but he
would have to contend with men like Lord Cranborne, a staunchly conservative member
of the status quo Tories. The Conservatives had spent a generation in the political
wilderness, only sporadically finding the light and leading a minority government until a
stronger Liberal government could be secured. Disraeli stated, and it was probably true,
that if Gladstone was successful it “would seat the Whigs for a lifetime.”2 The
Conservatives needed an issue to regain government, and for Disraeli reform was that
issue. Highly principled Gladstone believed in reform as a measure of civility. It could
bond the responsible worker to the government and the country and justify government
supremacy over them. Gladstone’s argument placed the opponents of reform in a position
of having to deny the fitness of the working man. Disraeli, on the other hand, was
indifferent toward reform and condemned it when it suited his position and demanded it
when his position changed. The rivalry between these two shaped the final act and in the
views of Conservatives wildly spun the measure out of control. Had the Liberal majority
coalesced around the issue of reform instead of splintering, Gladstone’s bill in 1866
would have passed. Had Conservatives with true convictions against reform rallied
against Disraeli’s 1867 Act, it would have certainly died. Disraeli is given total credit for
the Reform Act which enfranchised the working-class for the first time, and while it was
passed under his leadership, he could not have accomplished it without Gladstone who is
given no credit for his part in initiating the moderate reform bill in 1866. Gladstone
believed “that to carry enfranchisement…was essential to character, essential to credit,
essential to usefulness,…not merely of the political party, but of this house, and of
successive parliaments.”3 While much scholarly literature has been written on the Reform
Act of 1867 there remains a need to examine where credit rests. Because of the condition
of their parties, true credit for the passage of the Reform Act of 1867 lies with Disraeli
and Gladstone.
Wilbur Jones paints a picture of Lord Derby from his youth to his ultimate
position as a leader of the Conservative party in parliament.4 Under Derby’s leadership,
however, the Conservative party remained out of politics for two decades, leading the
author to question his leadership. Was it poor leadership, or insurmountable
circumstances which led to this tenure out of office? Jones argues that it was a
combination of both. Disraeli is given credit for many things during the time of this
cooperation, but Jones suggests that Disraeli’s aggressiveness in the Commons and
Derby’s ornamental presence in the Lords balanced the relationship and clouded the view
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of who was responsible for reform. As Jones writes, “[Disraeli’s] whole career seemed to
be a process of gradually compromising the special privileges of his class.”5
Henry Pelling argues that America’s democratic and representative system
influenced British radicals who believed a similar system needed to be imported. While
the radicals praised American democracy, Conservatives feared they would lose power to
reform. The British working class felt strongly about the abolition of slavery and
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation turned support towards the north. America was
then seen as the free and democratic nation it claimed to be. This newfound support for
democracy fueled radical calls for parliamentary reform.6
Maurice Cowling explains the Reform Act from the perspective of the
Conservative party and as a conservative he argues that historians think of mid-nineteenth
century politics as a period influenced by liberals. They believe it was a combination of
radical and liberal groups that gained the support of the working class while neglecting
the influence of Conservatives to rally support from the same workers. Cowling questions
the validity of the argument that the reform bill symbolized rapid political change
because parliament not only thought of itself as the ruling assembly of a highly stable
society, but that it took offense to any suggestion to the contrary.7
Gertrude Himmefarb looks at the Second Reform Bill as an important step toward
future reforms in 1884, 1918, and 1928, even placing it above the influence of the Great
Reform Act of 1832. She suggests that Conservatives coped with a more flexible
approach to reform than the Liberals, particularly because they placed greater emphasis
on national identity and class linking. Liberals expected individual voters to pursue their
own narrow and ignorant self-interest at the expense of the common good, and thereby
expected the worst out of new voters.8
Giovanni Costigan examines important men in British politics, two of which are
important to this research, Benjamin Disraeli and William Gladstone, and argues that it
was Disraeli’s uniqueness that reinvigorated the Conservative party and Gladstone’s
steadfastness that brought purpose to the Liberal party. To Gladstone, politics was a most
serious business involving a lifetime’s dedication, to Disraeli it was a game. Gladstone
perceived power as the triumph of principle and hard work whereas to Disraeli it meant
the enjoyment of ambition achieved. Costigan suggests that “Victorian Liberalism, in its
virtues and its defects, was incarnate in one man, William Ewart Gladstone,”9 and that
Gladstone rationalized the government and transferred its control from the aristocratic
elite to the leaders of the new democracy. To Costigan reform would be something
indicative of Gladstone yet the victory of Disraeli in the second Reform bill was
indicative of his drive for success and power.
E.J. Feuchtwanger’s first book examines the fragmented Conservative Party
before the bill and the strengthening of the party after it. To Feuchtwanger, modern
Toryism in the 1860s was the continuing belief in the need for authority and a governing
elite in politics. He argues that the Liberal party responded to influences from outside the
party by radical groups while the Conservatives reached out from their political base to
potential new voters, an effort from the top leaders, not the grass roots. These top leaders,
Disraeli in particular, helped weave a tight group of Conservatives into a party
organization that the author believes was an important legacy that changed the nature of
British politics. He believes the Liberals failed, because they did not have a strong,
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cohesive party. Instead, it was loose coalition of Radicals, Liberals, and Whigs that were
unable to stand internal pressure against reform for the greater good of the party.10
H.G.C Mathew argues that Gladstone wanted reform to legitimate the
government’s taxation of workers who until 1867 had no vote.11
E.J. Feuchtwanger’s biography on Disraeli is in many regards a very similar book
to his older book, but he describes in better detail the scheme of Disraeli. He argues that
Disraeli had planned his actions on the second Reform bill two years earlier and waited
for Liberal rhetoric to hang them and their bill.12
Richard Shannon argues a similar point to that of Feuchtwanger and Himmelfarb.
He believes that while not wanting extensive reform, Disraeli was the driving force
behind Tory democracy and modern conservatism. He was the pre-eminent statesman
who’s “genius led him to discern in the inarticulate mass of the English populace” the
desire and support for conservatism.13
F.B. Smith argues that the Reform Act of 1867 was a piece of legislation which
directly affected the distribution of power in Britain. Eloquent speeches, intractable
franchise law, and the leadership of the two protagonists, Disraeli and Gladstone, led to a
more radical reform than expected. Gladstone was principled for reform while Disraeli
was principled in regard to the landed interest. He suggests that Disraeli “create[d] the
‘Tory faith in the people’ almost as a by product, by emphasizing the necessity for the
traditional ruling class to continue to lead and by appropriating from the Radicals the
doctrine of social unity.”14 This statement indicates his belief in Disraeli the reformer.
The works above have poured extensive time and effort into the topic of
parliamentary reform and the second Reform bill in particular. They however lack the
zeal to award half of the victory to the Liberals and their leader Gladstone. The 1867 bill
was certainly indicative of Disraeli’s guile and cannot be mistaken to be something that
Gladstone would have allowed to happen. Whether or not Gladstone would appreciate the
praise this scholarship levies upon him for his initial attempt at reform in 1866, and his
successive reforms in the 1870s and 1880s, he will receive it anyway.
History of Reform from 1832-1865
In the eyes of radicals, the Reform Act of 1832 had been a sell out by moderates.
These radicals believed that this was a temporary arrangement that would be superceded
by something more substantial. Their fears surrounding the tenure of the Great Reform
Act were confirmed when the government began passing acts that outraged the working
class. The Anatomy Act of 1832 remedied the shortfall of corpses used in medical
training, by making the unclaimed bodies of workers who had died in workhouses,
available for study. This was seen as a threat to the dignity and, it was thought, hopes of
salvation of the dead. The Poor Law Act of 1834 threatened to break up families that
applied for poor relief. It aimed at turning a request for assistance in a time of hardship
into a source of shame and moral failure. Parliament failed to acknowledge the need for
factory reform and its continuing persecution of trade unions lead to heated protest. The
Tolpuddle martyrs was an example of a group of workers who organized and in doing so
broke the law. The martyrs were six farmers prosecuted for forming a branch of the
Labourers’ Union at Tolpuddle. They were convicted and sent to Australia and Tasmania
to serve a seven year sentence. Only after protest and petition by trade unionists was the
sentence reduced to two years.15 Concerns over issues outside of work, yet damaging to
the working class nonetheless, lead to concern over the paying of taxes to the Church of
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England regardless of membership as well as the permanence of the Corn Laws which
kept the price of grain artificially higher than its should have been through the restriction
of free trade.
These legislative programs against labor unions and the working class enabled the
Chartist movement to enlist a mass following at a time of stress in the late 1830s and
early 1840s. Chartism was an umbrella movement, sheltering and interlocking with other
concerns, from temperance to education, from trade unionism to women’s rights.
Members of the movement adopted a six point plan: an extension of the vote to males
over the age of twenty-one, a secret ballot, equality of constituency size, a removal of
property qualifications for Members of Parliament (MPs), payments to MPs, and the
meeting of annual parliaments. The chartists envisioned a plan aimed at making the
parliament more accessible to the working class as well as gaining manhood suffrage.
Enactment of the People’s Charter would have provided a sweeping transformation of
parliament greater than the 1867 act would eventually provide. In 1839, industrial
workers in Newport revolted against harsh working and living conditions and were fired
upon by soldiers. Despite the Newport Rising in 1839, a strike in 1842, and a mass
meeting on Kennington Common in 1848, the Chartists were unable to gain success by
constitutional or insurrectionary means.16 After 1848, they lost support which had been
intermittent and indecisive. Economic conditions improved and governments became
more responsive to moderate reforms. The issue of corn law repeal had been taken up by
Peel on his own convictions and with the prodding of the Chartist rival organization, the
Anti-Corn Law League. The church began to retreat from taxation. The new Poor Law
did not turn out to be as bad as originally thought. Chartism was also challenged by other
organizations such as William Lovett’s People’s League and Bronterre O’Brien’s
National Reform League which competed for Chartist followers. Chartists also faced
opposition from middle class radicals like the Administrative Reform Association which
held the view that the only thing that needed to be changed in parliament was the
distribution of seats, not the qualification to vote.17 Working-class reformers began
concentrating on narrower, readily attainable goals, one of which was educating the
working man, making him respectable and worthy of the vote.
Limited reform proposals emerged in the parliaments of the 1850s, most from
Lord John Russell.18 In 1849 he floated a bill to enfranchise ₤5 householders19 in the
boroughs and ₤20 tenants in counties, but his cabinet expressed profound indifference
toward it and the bill died. In 1852 he introduced a similar bill, this time including a
merger of the smallest borough seats. However, his ministry was disintegrating over the
issue and the bill was aborted. Russell was, however, not a radical and he would have
nothing to do with proposals for the secret ballot or wider reaching reforms which
emanated from the radical fringes of the party.20
In October 1858, John Bright picked up the gauntlet of parliamentary reform and
announced his commitment to reform at two meetings in Birmingham. His proposal was
less radical than it would seem at face value. While he called for redistribution of
parliamentary seats and the secret ballot, his proposal advocated a reduction in the
householder rates to ₤10. Of this proposal Ernest Jones offers this criticism: “a suffrage
for the middle classes, and exclusion for the great masses of the people.” 21 He later
exclaimed, “Working Men! Brother Chartists!...Rush together in your meetings, and pass
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formal emphatic resolutions, openly and formally repudiating the measure of Mr.
Bright,…and declaring yourselves for registered manhood suffrage.”22
Benjamin Disraeli was the moving spirit behind an 1859 Conservative bill that he
felt was of expediency for the party. It aimed at equaling the county and borough
franchises by compelling borough voters to vote within their city rather than in their
county. This measure had the desired effect of creating a safe haven within county seats
for conservatism. Seventy seats were to be transferred from small towns, fifty-two of
them to counties and eighteen to larger cities. No new changes to voter qualifications
would be made in this bill. The minority government was unable to stop the Liberals
from mobilizing opposition from left and right. The failure of the bill was greeted with
resounding apathy and little interest was taken in the extinguishing of another Russell
scheme in 1860. He declared that “the apathy of the country is undeniable. Nor is it a
transient humor; it seems a rather confirmed habit of mind.”23
Edward Baines’ bill in 1864 elicited a response from Gladstone that indicates his
movement toward reform, and would lay the groundwork for his future bill. This
changing attitude toward reform led to his exalted name, “The People’s William.”
Commentary between Gladstone and the Prime minister, Lord Palmerston, point to the
uneasy relationship between the two. Palmerston wrote:
In what you may say upon Baines’ bill you will not commit yourself and the
Government as to any particular amount of borough franchise…No doubt many
workingmen are as fit to vote as many of the ten pounders [the current franchise],
but if we open the door to the class the number who may come in may be
excessive and may swamp the classes above them.24
Either Gladstone did not receive the message in time, or he misunderstood, because his
speech in Parliament on the bill was far more provocative than anyone expected. He
proclaimed that “Every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration
of personal unfitness or of political danger is morally entitled to come within the pale of
the Constitution.”25 Upon reading the transcript of Gladstone’s speech, Palmerston fired
off a message to his lieutenant. “The function of Government” he reminded, was “to calm
rather than excite agitation.”26 Palmerston’s feeling toward what the population was
entitled to is evinced by this statement, “what every Man and Woman have a right to, is
to be well governed and under just laws.”27 Their acerbic relationship would soon end,
and the bulwark against reform was soon removed.
The failure of these initiatives and the lack of excitement over them from inside as
well as outside of parliament made many wonder if reform was dead. Efforts to rally
radical support were unsuccessful outside of London, in Tyneside, Birmingham,
Manchester, and Glasgow.28 There was not enough of a public presence to elicit the
intended response of Parliament. Party factions made reform measures difficult
endeavors because party discipline was weak.
Incredible disproportion remained in the distribution of parliamentary seats,
especially when one looks at the electoral power of the largest cities. In 1864 the nine
largest constituencies, Tower Hamlets, Marylebone, Finsbury, Manchester, Liverpool,
Birmingham, Lambeth, Westminster, and Leeds had a combined population of 3.3
million people and returned 18 members to the House of Commons. This is a ratio of
roughly one member per 180,000 people. Eleven small cities, Wells, Totnes, Thetford,
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Northallerton, Marlborough, Ashburton, Lyme Regis, Evesham, Honiton, Arundell, and
Dartmouth had a combined population of 44,000 returned 17 members, which equate to
one member per 2,600 people. Sixty seven boroughs with a population under 10,000
elected 106 members. One hundred and forty five boroughs with between 10,000 and
20,000 people elected 215. And twenty six boroughs with population between 50,000 and
200,000, elected 52 members to parliament. In 1866, 250,291 electors in small boroughs
of England and Wales, one-fifth of the electorate, were able to elect 328 members, or half
of the House of Commons.29 The borough franchise remained unchanged since the
Reform Act of 1832. A man, twenty one years of age, residing in a house within seven
miles of the city limits and paying a minimum yearly rental of ₤10 was qualified to
vote.30
The aristocratic element contributed to the stubbornness of Parliament. A
reduction in the franchise could flood the Commons with new blood and push old
established names and families out. In 1865 there were 37 peers or elder sons of peers, 64
younger sons, and 15 grandsons, a total of 116 members. There were 71 baronets, 11
elder sons, 19 younger sons, and 8 grandsons, a total baronetage of 109. Together these
two equal 225 members. In addition there were 100 commoners connected to the peerage
by marriage or descent. This amounted to 326 members, or half the House of Commons.
These seats were rather evenly distributed, however, with the Conservative holding 175
and the Liberals holding 150. One member had thirty other sitting members related to
him by birth or marriage. In 1859, 31 families supplied 110 members to the Commons,
equal to the representation of Ireland, twice that of Scotland, and five times that of
London.31 It has been suggested that “Politics had become a pastime, marked by
oratorical combats and divisions, of which the outcome did not matter much.”32
Making of the Second Reform Act from 1865-1866
Upon Palmerston’s death on 18 October 1865, Lord John Russell began his final
stint as Prime Minister with Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer. With the
intransigence to reform that was Palmerston out of the way, Gladstone and Russell began
a move in 1866 toward reform. As Gladstone remarked during the first reading of the bill,
“with no delay…after the death of our lamented head…we applied ourselves.”33 They
began to believe in a safe top layer of working-class city dwellers who could be granted
the franchise without threatening the landed aristocracy in the counties. This would be
accomplished by not only lowering the borough qualification, but including provisions to
increase the number of seats in the counties for the gentry to control. This should appease
Liberals without destroying the entire power structure, making passage potentially easier.
The question which Russell and Gladstone focused on was how far below the current ten
pound householder qualification in the cities was safe to enfranchise the responsible,
deserving worker and yet high enough to keep those amenable to bribery and class
warfare out.34 On 7 March 1866 Gladstone and Russell settled on a seven pound annual
rental as the basis for the borough franchise. A seven pound qualification works out to a
weekly income of twenty six shillings, putting the franchise ahead of unskilled hand
laborers, but within the range of artisans and shopkeepers.35 Enfranchising these workers
strengthens the constitution, “for the attachment of the people to the throne, the
institutions, and the laws in which they live is…more than silver and gold.”36 Two days
later, evidence was presented that in one hundred and sixteen boroughs in England and
Wales more than twenty five percent of the electorate was already working class.
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Opponents of reform seized upon this and asked why reform was necessary. Despite this
new found animosity toward reform, Gladstone introduced on 12 March a hastily
concocted bill, based on inadequate information, but with little support from a cabinet
that was at best indifferent and at worst hostile toward it.37 During the first reading of the
bill he asked the cabinet “to apply themselves and the best powers they possessed to the
framing of a prudent, effectual measure”38 During the first reading of the bill, Gladstone
made reference to the Reform Act of 1832 and how it was insufficient and had not
evolved to meet current possibilities. According to him the working class, “ought to have
borne an increasing and growing proportion,” instead of a “dwindling and diminishing
proportion.” and that “the time has arrived when something ought to be done to increase
their share in the elective franchise.”39
Aside from the lack of support from Conservatives, Gladstone had to deal with
Aristocratic Whiggish Liberals of Palmerstonian flavor who were as vitreous toward
reform. A combination of these two groups could easily defeat the bill. Right-wing
Liberals under the guidance of Robert Lowe attacked the bill as unnecessary and a threat
to constitutional stability. He proclaimed, “If you want venality, if you want ignorance, if
you want drunkenness, and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other hand, you
want impulsive, unreflecting, and violent people, where do you look…Do you go to the
top or to the bottom?”40
They were in turn criticized by John Bright as the forty thieves and as Adullamites, a
biblical reference to David at the Cave of Adullam.41 The verse reads, “all those who
were in distress or in debt or discontented gathered around him.”42
Stepping ahead of Lord Derby, Disraeli mobilized Conservatives against the bill.
He claimed on 27 April that democracy would destroy an element of English civilization
and degrade England “from being a first-rate Kingdom, to become a third-rate
Republic.”43 He further argued that,
There will be no charm of tradition; no prescription spell; no families of historic
lineage; none of the great estates round which men rally when liberty is assailed;
no statesmanship, no eloquence, no learning, no genius. Instead of this you will
have a horde of selfish obscure mediocrities, incapable of anything but mischief,
and that mischief devised and regulated by the raging demagogue of the hour.44
They brought down the bill by joining with the Adullamites and forced the
government to combine the redistribution of parliamentary seats with the franchise
reforms instead of considering these two complex yet related measures separately. The
cabinet proposed transferring 49 seats from small boroughs, 26 of them going to the
counties and fifteen to the industrial towns and larger boroughs. Other smaller towns
were to be grouped together to form larger more apportioned constituencies. This
proposal however would have extended the electoral imbalance further toward the
Liberals, but at the same time threatening the constituencies of several of their current
supporters.45
On 18 June 1866, Dunkellin’s Amendment was proposed to base the borough
qualification on the payment of rates as opposed to payment based on rental value.46 This
made the bill unacceptable and the cabinet had to decide what action to take next. On the
19 June Russell, Gladstone, and three others voted to dissolve the House and call
elections on the issue of reform. Clarendon, Grey, and four others voted to resign.
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Granville and two others voted to continue the current bill.47 After much wrangling
within the cabinet, Russell tendered his resignation as prime minister on 26 June. A
Conservative minority government then took over.
Despite the level of oratory surrounding the reform act, it was not a top priority.
Parliament was occupied by issues involving the budget, foreign affairs, and a cattle
plague. Malaise amongst the working class also contributed to parliamentary inaction.
Lord Stanley suggested that “the political excitement among the upper classes is greater
than it has been for the last seven or eight years. I do not believe that it is shared to any
considerable extent by the people.”48
This statement was made on 10 June. By the 24 June, however, these same
workers began to change their minds as they followed the defeat of Gladstone’s bill in the
newspapers. Serious reformers began angry meetings and demonstrations, led by The
Reform League, whose leadership, composed of intellectuals, trade unionists, and
manufacturers, gained the support of the workers they represented through meetings held
at Trafalgar Square. On 23 July tempers boiled over and reform agitation culminated in
the Hyde Park riots which attracted three thousand people. The most notable incident
during the riots was the destruction of park railings, but this can probably be attributed to
overcrowding, not intentional violence. The most unfortunate event during the riots was
the death of a police officer. Events at Hyde Park did have the effect of frightening
League leaders who feared violence would undermine the steadily increasing image of
the responsible worker.49 The riots were not the only thing that exemplified the
irresponsible working class. During Lord Derby’s 1865 nomination, a man was pelted by
dead cats and rabbits. At another, a man threw a mixture of rotten eggs, flour, soot, and
red brick dust.50
It also affected the Conservative minority government of Derby and Disraeli by
adding public pressure to the reform question. But as has been argued, “The passage of
the Reform Act of 1867 was affected in a context of public agitation: it cannot be
explained as a simple consequence.”51
Derby and Disraeli were in a difficult position when they took office in 1866. The
Palmerston majority from the election of 1865 had splintered upon the issue of the 1866
reform bill. If Liberals were able to coalesce, any bill brought by Disraeli could have
been stopped by Gladstone. They also faced a ring-wing aristocracy that detested reform.
Indifferent toward reform himself, Disraeli saw an opportunity he could not refuse. His
party had been in the political wilderness for a generation and this issue, if played just
right, might usher in a new era for the Conservative party. If he did nothing, his minority
government would only prolong an inevitable loss to the Liberals in the next election.
The last part of 1866 was spent establishing committees and drafting half-hearted clauses
that would be drawn together to form a bill. Their purpose was to delay legislation while
preventing Liberal initiative. The clauses were accepted on 8 November 1866.52 One of
these resolutions stated a position counter to the eventual bill of 1867. “While it is
desirable that a more direct representation should be given to the laboring classes, it is
contrary to the Constitution of this realm to give to any one class…a predominating
power over the rest of the community.”53
There was another reform bill in 1866, this one proposed by a radical friend of
Disraeli, James Clay, who introduced the idea that a persons voting fitness should be
determined by his knowledge and cognitive ability. Such a test would include “writing
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from dictation…simple addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of money.”54
This test was however harder than the civil service exam for clerkships.
The Making of Reform from 1866-1867
Parliament reconvened on 5 February 1867 and from the beginning Disraeli
worked to pre-empt Liberal initiative and, if possible, widen the gulf that doomed
Gladstone’s bill while maintaining a suspicious cabinet. To quell talk of resignation
amongst his fellow cabinet members, on February 25th Disraeli threw together a
haphazard bill in a matter of minutes. This replaced his earlier more radical intention with
a simple ₤6 rating in the boroughs. It became known as the ten minutes bill.55 On 2
March Lord Cranborne, Lord Carnarvon, and Jonathan Peel, resigned from the
government because it was clear that Disraeli’s bill was moving toward the more radical
household suffrage regardless of rental value or rate paid.56 Of Peel, Disraeli wrote that
he was, “very placable, except on the phrase ‘household suffrage,’ when his eye lights up
with insanity.”57 Disraeli had toyed with ways of passing a household suffrage bill
without the actual ramifications of true household suffrage. He conjured up the idea of
what came to be known as the fancy franchises. Voters rated at and above ₤10 would
receive two votes, those over ₤20 would receive three votes.58 Public agitation, the fancy
franchises, and the hope that a reform bill would sweep the Conservatives back into
office garnered the support of rank and file members of the same Conservative party that
killed Gladstone’s bill a year earlier. New proposals called for household suffrage for all
those who paid rates in person, not through an intermediary. This provision would be a
major restriction in towns where most property was rented and rates were paid through a
landlord. The working vote in the county was to be reduced from the ₤50 rental
established in 1832 to a rental of ₤15.
The bill was introduced to the Commons on 18 March. Disraeli’s speech on the
first night was a resounding success, as is obvious by Derby’s congratulatory letter the
next day. He writes, “I cannot let the day pass over without offering you my cordial
congratulations on your splendid achievement of last night. I hear from all quarters that it
was the finest speech you ever made;…In fact, you have won our game for us.”59
Disraeli’s position on reform had changed somewhat in a year’s time. He proclaimed that
reform was needed because “our object is not only to maintain, but to strengthen the
character and functions of this House.”60 In his speech Disraeli made his case for
household suffrage: “you let in a very large and very indiscriminate number to the
enjoyment of the right without the preliminary performance of duties, and when they are
let in you leave a great many behind them, who, because others are let in, immediately
cry out to be admitted. Then where is your settlement.”61
The fancy franchises were soon dropped as was the two-year residence
requirement, which was reduced to a single year.62 The most controversial concession
made by Disraeli came on 17 May. Hodgkinson’s amendment called for the abolition of
compounding as a basis for the franchise qualification. Compounders paid their rates, or
taxes, with their rent to their landlord who paid the collector. This arrangement suited the
tenants because it spread payments out over time. It suited the collector because if made
for certainty of payment. It suited the landlord because he collected a fee for taking on
the risk.63 This made household suffrage a reality by removing the last obstacle. The final
bill also lowered the county franchise to twelve pounds.
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The act went far beyond anything that Gladstone would have sanctioned and its
final form can be attributed to Disraeli’s guile and the fact that he was willing to accept
any amendment to the bill as long as it was not Gladstone’s. The extra-parliamentary
pressure after the defeat of Gladstone’s bill in 1866 created a swing of opinion amongst
the Tory backbenchers. While they still were against reform on an ideological basis, they
supported the radical measure for fear that something less would lead to their downfall.
The most striking feature of the Reform Act of 1867 was its wide extension of
franchise, a surprise made all the more remarkable because it was a Conservative
government that passed the bill. Had the bill been passed with the safeguards of
compounding and plural voting intact, the increased electorate would have been
marginally larger than the proposed extension in Gladstone’s 1866 bill. Had plural voting
remained, the aristocratic power would have been greatly increased.64 In the boroughs of
England and Wales, the electorate increased by 134 percent, the counties, by 46 percent.
Another surprise is the outcome within cities.65 Urban areas voted Liberal and any
extension of the electorate would increase that lead. This was a conscious attempt to
secure county constituencies for Conservative candidates while abandoning the cities to
Liberals. However, the inequality of the parliamentary constituencies remained. It has
been suggested that “there was nothing inevitable about the course they followed. If a
restrictive act could have been passed on a conservative basis, they would have passed
it.”66
At a speech in Edinburgh, Disraeli suggested that the other reform bills failed
because they were not based on principle. “I say whatever degradation of value you
make, whether it be ₤8, ₤7, ₤6, ₤5, you are equally far from a principle” and only pander
to constituents,67 and that “the Tory Party…is formed of all classes from the highest to
the most homely” Later he claimed that he “had to prepare the mind of the country, and
to educate our party.”68 He argued that a man with a house has a stake in the community
and therefore should have the vote.
Lord Cranborne69 voiced his concerns on the new act. He feared that democracy
would introduce a spoils system for trade union leaders and corrupt party managers and
that the working class that they purportedly served would siphon off aristocratic wealth.
To Robert Lowe, democracy would degenerate as a result of the working class’ lack of
education and that their narrowly defined self-interest conflicted with the responsibility
of looking to the nation as a whole. A Palmerstonian Whig remarked that “Derby has set
himself to prove that dishonesty is the best policy…Where we have lifted the sluices of
democracy an inch, he and Dizzy have raised them a foot. My hope is that they will be
the first to be washed away in the flood.”70
Even with the redistricting clauses of the 1867 Reform Act, the distribution of
Parliamentary seats remained skewed toward the system of the past. Medieval market
towns like Calne, Bridgnorth, and Coleriane continued to return more than half the
borough members and more than one fifth of the House of Commons.71
In 1867 there were 1,367,000 adult male occupiers in the parliamentary boroughs
of England and Wales. Among them, 507,700 were compound householders. 94,000 of
them were rated at or above the ₤10 line and 476,600 were rated below it. The bill after
Hodgkinson’s amendment enfranchised a total of 500,000 men. The original proposal
estimated the number to be around 120,000 men.72 After the 1867 Act boroughs of
Britain experienced an increase of 830,000 voters. The 1866 plan estimated an increase
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of 200,000 men, and this was the one Conservatives and Liberals alike wrote off as too
radical. The overall extension of the franchise in Britain increased from 1,360,000 voters
in 1866, to 2,480,000 voters in 1868.73
The fears of many Conservatives, who felt that an extension of the working class
vote would lead to Liberal victory and not their own, seemed to be confirmed. The
election of 1868 went to the Liberals and Gladstone formed his first government as prime
minister. The Conservative challenge of Liberal seats failed in comparison to the effort
mobilized by the Liberals. In 1865, 159 Liberal held seats had been uncontested, while
143 Conservative seats were uncontested. When, in 1868, Conservatives challenged all
but 122 Liberal held seats, the Liberals fought back and left only 100 Conservative held
seats unchallenged.74 Complexities within the voter registration system hampered the
effects of the Reform Act, and its full impact was not evident until 1874, when the
Conservatives would win and Disraeli would form his first Government.75
History of Reform from 1868-1885
Gladstone’s first and second terms in office as prime minister are a further
example of his commitment to reform. The passage of the Ballot Act of 1872 and the
Reform Act of 1884 furthered democracy. These did so by increasing the number of
people who could vote and by securing that vote free from outside pressure. These were
not the immediate goal of Gladstone, but his beliefs changed when he recognized the
need for such legislation.
He had come a great distance in his four decades of political life. There were very
few subjects on which his views remained the same from the 1830s to the 1870s. He had,
however, retained his resistance to the idea that those who deserved the vote also
deserved the right to exercise it secretly. His idealized image of the independent voter,
head held high, declaring his choice with fear may have represented himself and his
social peers, but is hard to reconcile with the average worker, whose employer may be
watching. His belief began to change and is exampled by an ambiguous speech to his
constituents in Greenwich. He said, “I have at all times given my vote in favor of open
voting, but I have done so before, and I do so now, with an important reservation,
namely, that whether by open voting or by whatsoever means, free voting must be
secured.”76
Before 1872, voting took place in public. It was common for printers to publish
lists of individual voters. These lists included the name of the voter, his address, and the
name of the candidate he voted for. 77
In 1870, the Postmaster General, the Marquess of Hartington, Spencer Cavendish,
introduced an anti-corrupt practices bill which would have introduced ballot voting. It
was given low priority and the bill foundered. A new bill brought to the commons
received a much greater push due to backing from the Prime Minister. Gladstone argued
that many whose occupations made them vulnerable to pressure now had the vote and
protection of these votes was necessary. This implied less of a desire and more of a
necessity. This is confirmed by his diary entry on 29 June 1871. “Spoke on ballot, and
voted in 324-230 with mind satisfied and as to feeling a lingering reluctance.”78
When the House of Lords threw out the bill, Gladstone reacted with more passion
than he exhibited toward the bill originally. Speeches denouncing the Lords, the threat of
calling an autumn session in 1872, and finally the threat of resigning began to change
minds. The conservatives wanted Gladstone to fail and so would refuse to take office.
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This convinced the House of Lords to accept Gladstone’s bill. The first secret-ballot byelection took place 15 August 1872.79
In 1881 there were still 72 members representing boroughs with populations
under 10,000. Combined, these amount to less than half a million people. 75 members
represented boroughs of over 100,000 people, and combined, they totaled a population of
over 9,000,000.80 Large towns had suburbs which were becoming increasingly middle
class conservative. In 1884, Lord Salisbury wanted to capitalize on this urban
conservatism by rooting for equal electoral districts. This would enable Tories to turn
suburban support into seats in Parliament.81 An example of these conservative urban
areas and their effect on elections can be seen in the results of the election of 1874. Tories
won 44 of 114 seats in boroughs with populations over 50,000, up from 25 in 1868. In
boroughs under 20,000 they won 60 seats, up from 52 in 1868.82
This inequality within parliamentary districting and the fact that the 1867 Reform
Act only enfranchised the working class of the boroughs, led Gladstone to drive for
another reform bill. This one would introduce the voting qualifications of 1867 to the
counties. Conservatives, such as Lord Salisbury, were against any extension of the
franchise, that is letting any new voters in, and they demanded a redistribution bill
accompany any reform bill.
After wrangling with the House of Lords, Gladstone’s reform and redistribution
bill passed. The number of men who could vote dramatically increased from three million
to five million, creating the single largest enfranchisement out of the three Victorian
Reform Acts.83 Proportionally, however, the 1884 Act holds second place for percentage
of new voters compared to original voters. The 1832 Reform Act added 217,000 to the
electorate of 435,000, or 50 percent. The Reform Act of 1867 nearly doubled the
electorate with the addition of over a million voters. This is a 90 percent change. The
1884 Act raised the electorate by 60 percent. The additions in Ireland make the outcome
of the 1884 Act all the more striking. The effect of Catholic Emancipation was reduced
by restricting the Ireland franchise. The new act ended this and 230 percent were added to
Ireland’s registers.84
The Redistribution Act that was passed in 1885 changed the look of parliamentary
voting districts form the antiquated and unrepresentative system of the past, to the even
and fair system of today. The bill originally called for 46 boroughs with a population
under 10,000 to lose their separate representation, and 30 boroughs fewer than 40,000
people were to lose their second representative. Separate representation refers to the
common practice of small towns who should be lumped in with the county vote receive a
borough vote instead.85 Revisions to this bill called for towns under 15,000 people to lose
their separate representation. Furthermore, counties and big towns were divided into
single member districts. This provision is what visually resembles the even districts of
today.86
V. Conclusion
The Reform Act of 1867 increased the electorate of Great Britain from 1.4 million
to 2.4 million people and it served as a transformation between the propertied
constituencies of the 1850s to the inclusive reforms of the 1900s. The change in
Disraeli’s position at the end of 1866 was less about principle, as he claims, for if it were,
how could a principled man work so vehemently against reform. He worked against
Gladstone’s bill because he wanted the reform victory for himself. He would be able to
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proclaim that he passed reform when Liberals had tried so hard and for so long and had
failed. Because of the condition of their parties, true credit for the passage of the Reform
Act of 1867 lies with Disraeli and Gladstone. Someone had to start reform and someone
else had to finish it.
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